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0.1. African and anthropological lessons towards a philosophy of 
interculturality 
This book brings together fifteen essays investigating aspects of interculturality. It 
operates at the borderline between two disciplines:  
 
• anthropology (in which field I was trained at Amsterdam University, took a 
Ph.D. at the Free University (Amsterdam) in 1979, occupied various professorial 
chairs, and in the years 1980-1990 served as one of the scientific directors at the 
African Studies Centre, Leiden); and  
• intercultural philosophy, in which field I have occupied a chair at Erasmus 
University in Rotterdam since 1998.  
 
I seek to make, with this book, a contribution to intercultural philosophy, by 
formulating with the greatest possible precision and honesty the lessons my 
extensive intercultural experiences as an anthropologist have taught me.  
  The kaleidoscopic nature of intercultural experiences is reflected in the diversity 
of these fifteen texts. Many belong to a field that could be described as ‘meta-
anthropology’, others are more clearly philosophical; occasionally they spill over 
into belles lettres, ancient history, and comparative cultural and religious studies. 
The ethnographic specifics supporting the arguments are diverse. They derive from 
three of the African situations in which I have conducted participatory field research 
as an anthropologist: the North African highlands of Khumiriya (north-western 
Tunisia); urban and rural life of the Nkoya people of Zambia; and healing cults in 
urban Botswana. My fieldwork in Guinea-Bissau (1983) is not specifically 
represented in any of the chapters,1 and the discussion of the globalisation of 
1 Yet my work in Guinea-Bissau was in many ways a preparation for the present book. It was during that 
fieldwork that I crossed for the first time the line separating objectifying knowledge production, and personal 
participation, by becoming a patient of local healers. In 1985 I was invited to give seminars on my Guinea-
Bissau experience at the Research Unit Symbol and Symptom, Africa Research Centre, Catholic University 
Louvain, Belgium, and the discussions there, under the stimulating chairmanship of my long-standing friend 
and colleague René Devisch, were to have a deep and lasting impact on my anthropological practice. 
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Southern African thought and society in chapter 14 reflects not only my extensive 
Botswana fieldwork and my theoretical work on globalisation, but also my shorter 
excursions into South African and Zimbabwean society over the years. In chapters 1, 
3, 5, 6, 9, 10 and 14, problems of interculturality are discussed within specific local 
African contexts. However, other chapters have a non-localised theoretical focus 
(chapters 2, 12, 15), deal with the whole of Africa (chapters 4, 8, 11, 13), or start 
with a local African context and expand the argument so as to encompass long-
ranging continuities in space and time (chapters 7, 8). More than thirty years 
separate the oldest piece (chapter 1) from the more explicitly philosophical pieces 
that have been written in the last few years; in between is a series of papers written 
in the late 1980s to late 1990s and addressing an intercultural problematic while still 
largely relying on anthropological, as distinct from philosophical, conceptual and 
analytical resources.  
  How do these separate pieces together present an argument on interculturality? 
Let us review the four constituent Parts of this book one by one.  
0.1.1. Introducing Part II: The construction of intercultural knowledge 
through anthropological fieldwork 
After the Preliminaries of Part I, Part II presents anthropological research as a mode 
– until recently it was, for nearly a century, the privileged, if not only mode – of 
intercultural knowledge production by specialists identifying with the North Atlantic 
region.  
  The oldest piece (chapter 1) simply evokes the classic practice of anthropological 
fieldwork as a standard procedure in such knowledge production. It introduces 
themes that will remain with us throughout Parts II and III: the dependence of 
intercultural knowledge on personal relations between the subject seeking 
knowledge and the community whose, or about which, knowledge is being sought; 
and the way in which knowledge production is intimately related to the personal 
history and psyche of the producer. In chapter 1, written in 1969 soon after my first 
fieldwork, the problem of scientific knowledge production is certainly touched upon 
– after all, anthropological fieldwork had been presented to us, as students of that 
generation, as an agonising but superior method for the production of valid 
intercultural knowledge. Yet such methodological concerns merely appear here as 
problems within North Atlantic social science which in itself is taken for granted. 
They scarcely stand out yet as problems of interculturality. Interculturally, my 
central conscious problem then was to survive under the onslaught of the other 
society. It is only in the last weeks of the fieldwork, when the project can no longer 
shipwreck, that the hosts as described in this piece regain something of their own 
true humanity and begin to stand out as suffering human beings – but which twenty-
one year old, desperately seeking to realise the splendidly Faustian intellectual career 
that will make him forget his childhood suffering and at the same time live up to his 
mother’s exalted expectations, would have done much better? I have taken my ironic 




                                                          
novel Een buik openen (1988) – doing justice to the beauty, the humanity, the 
hospitality, the tenderness, of my Tunisian hosts – long before I could unmask him 
epistemologically, in the present book.  
  Chapter 2, which concentrates on the work of the French Marxist anthropologist 
Pierre-Philippe Rey, makes it clear that already in 1979 I had woken up, in practice 
although not yet in terminology, to the project of intercultural philosophy, seeking to 
formulate – in the Marxist idiom of the time, which had informed the theoretical 
framework of my first major book Religious change in Zambia (1979, 1981) – a 
‘theory of the peripheral class struggle’: one that could bring out the hegemonic 
assumptions, and the exploitative and subjugating relations of production, 
surrounding the practice of anthropology, as the then dominant form of intercultural 
knowledge production.  
  The concept of ‘hegemony’ refers to the political, ideological, economic and 
military processes by which, in the interaction between social groups or categories, 
one social group or category effectively reduces – often to practically zero – the 
possibilities of other social groups or categories for defining their own goals, 
priorities, destiny, and for realising those. The dominant group or category makes 
instead the other social groups or categories subservient to the realisation of the 
goals, priorities, destinies, of the dominant group. In Greek Antiquity, hegemony 
was exclusively conceived in terms of the military, political and economic relations 
between city states, particularly Sparta and Athens. In the course of the twentieth 
century CE,1 partly as a result of Gramsci’s work,2 the concept has widened so as to 
stress ideological factors and to apply to groups and categories typically wider than 
the nation state (for example North Atlantic hegemony, White hegemony, male 
hegemony, technocratic hegemony, the hegemony of the capitalist mode of 
production). Foucault reminded us once more of the fact – well-known to 
generations of anthropologists and historians – that hegemonic relationships at the 
macro-level (for example North Atlantic hegemony over the global society and 
economy) are reflected, implemented, realised, in intimate personal relationships, for 
example between masters and servants, men and women, teachers and students. 
Knowledge production is never neutral but either hegemonic or counter-hegemonic, 
1 My systematic use of CE and BCE to calibrate dates even when the period of reference is manifest, is no 
mere affectation. In the first place, most of my readers will not be historians. In the second place, taking one’s 
own perspective for granted is a most common but also a most detestable geopolitical and hegemonic strategy, 
whereas we need to develop – with the assistance of intercultural philosophy – a sense not only for the 
universal and perennial, but also for the ephemeral and accidental, in our own statements as well as in those of 
others. In the third place, my usage calls attention to the fact that the ‘Christian’ or ‘Common’ Era (CE) is a 
hegemonic North Atlantic concept whose particularism we should not dissimulate. For the great majority of 
people in the contemporary world, the traditional (and most probably erroneous) year of birth of the founder 
of Christianity is an unlikely and irrelevant calibration point for time reckoning. As is the case with so many 
hegemonic concepts, this calendrical concept reveals its hegemonic nature precisely by its unfounded but 
taken-for-granted claim to universality. 
2 Gramsci 1975, 1977. 
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i.e. reinforcing a particular hegemonic structure, or seeking to explode that 
structure.1 
  In chapter 3 (1984) I find myself caught in the aesthetic contemplation of the 
dialectics between thou and I at the girl’s initiation rite of the Zambian Nkoya, a 
stance that renders problematic my major identities as a Westerner,2 an adult male, 
and an anthropological observer meant to return to my North Atlantic home after a 
spell of fieldwork. Like the concentric scales that make up the body of an onion, 
these layers are analysed, and cut away, one after the other, and in the process we 
learn a great deal about Nkoya sexuality – ending up with the stalemate of an 
intercultural promise unfulfilled.  
  Chapter 4 continues the line of chapter 2 when, almost a decade later, with 
greater complexity and with a less narrowly neo-Marxist anthropological analysis, I 
reflect on the future of anthropology in Africa, identify the strengths and the 
weaknesses of the anthropological model of knowledge production through 
fieldwork, and pinpoint the assumptions of inequality on which that model is based. 
The extensive Postscript by which I seek to bring this piece up to date, makes it clear 
that others at the time have felt the crisis in anthropological production in similar 
ways as I did, and that in the one and a half decades elapsed since, some advances 
have been made to counter the inequalities in which that crisis originated. I did not 
wait for anthropology to remedy itself: the crisis proceeded in me a highly 
idiosyncratic response to be detailed in Part III.  
  The descriptive fieldwork chapters 1 and 3 vividly convey the complexity and 
perplexity of intercultural encounters ‘in vivo’. But they do more than document a 
particular mode of intercultural knowledge production. In essence they are about the 
agony produced by the naïve knowledge model employed in classic anthropology. 
On the basis of this model, anthropological fieldwork dictates total immersion and 
extreme adaptation in the field: a mimicry that amounts to the virtual prohibition on 
the fieldworker’s mediating, in the fieldwork situation, her3 own and innermost self 
1 Cf. Bernal 1994; Comaroff & Comaroff 1992; Csordas 1988; Foucault 1963, 1973, and in Rabinow 1984; 
Geschiere 1986; Semmes 1992; Winant 1994. 
2 Established usage disregards the cardinal directions and ignores the Eurocentric implications implied in 
fixing to a particular geographical position what is in essence a relative standpoint; e.g. by the shortest route, 
Europe is east for the Americas, and the North Atlantic region as a whole is east for Japan and China. Yet for 
convenience’s sake I follow this usage and write ‘Western’, ‘Westerner’, to denote the hegemonically-inclined 
cultural traditions of the North Atlantic region especially Europe. In this connection, the opposite of Western 
would be South or Southern, and by implication Western itself may become North, Northern. I reserve 
‘western’ and the other three directions, written without initial capital letter, to denote mere geographical 
position, unless the word is part of a proper name, e.g. Western Province (formerly Barotseland), an officially 
designated province in western Zambia. For the subdivision of continents however I follow established usage 
again and write South Asia, not south Asia.  
3 I am aware that anthropologists come in two genders. But since anthropology is a discipline to which women 
have greatly contributed from the beginning, and since many of the dilemmas inherent in the anthropologist’s 
role remind us of similar dilemmas in women’s roles in many societies including the North Atlantic one, I will 





                                                                                                                                                                                 
as constructed throughout the previous years of her life before fieldwork. The 
rationale of this model is the assumption that: 
 
(1) living (or rather emulating) other people’s lives is an adequate way of learning 
about their life and how they structure it,  
 
to such an extent that 
 
(2) given only the proper methods, it is possible to arrive at an analytical, distant, 
textual (or cinematographic, or using any other medium as the case may be) 
representation of what constitutes other people’s lives – a representation that is 
essentially without distortion, free from projections, transferences,1 one-sided 
impositions and omissions, on the part of the representer. 
 
  Assumption (1) is reasonable and commendable – it is good and human to live 
with the people, to learn their language, to share their moments of joy and grief over 
a longer period and to compensate, by emphatic signs of identification, for the fact 
that somatically, socially, in terms of class position, in terms of power and income, 
in terms of the temporariness and the escapability of membership of the local 
community, the fieldworker stands out – in the eyes of the host group – as the utter 
stranger2 in most situations and practically throughout her fieldwork. But, naïvely 
and with the blatant lack of erudition typical of the social sciences in the second half 
of the twentieth century, assumption (2) goes against the grain of all accumulative 
hermeneutical investigation in philosophy over the past two centuries. However 
effective our threshold-lowering mimicry as under (1), yet the representation as 
under (2) will always and necessarily remain defective and distortive. Therefore the 
However, it is only fair to revert to the male gender when discussing myself as a fieldworker, or the 
peculiarities of fieldworkers in general.  
1 Kovel 1978: 311f gives the following useful definitions of these mechanisms: 
‘Transference: the conscious repetition of a past situation in a present situation. The concept has been 
strictly defined for psychoanalysis, in which vis-à-vis the therapist a transference version is developed of 
the original juvenile neurosis, which is then overcome in this way. But the concept of transference is 
applicable to any therapeutic situation – and in fact to any situation in which differences in power play a 
role. 
Projection: a defence mechanism whereby subjective characteristics are attributed to the objective world, 
as when we are angry at someone yet experience that person to be angry with us. Projection may or may 
not correspond with the truth; what counts is the role they play in the falsification of consciousness.’  
From a more specifically Freudian perspective, in all such situations psychic energy may be said to be bound 
by a past conflict, while the more or less compulsive, symbolic re-enacting of that conflict, as a sign of 
neurosis, partially releases such energy in a way that is experienced as gratificatory, in other words libidinous. 
Although in everyday language the libidinous has come to be equated with the sexual, usually such re-
enacting and release have no manifest sexual connotations.  
2 Notably, as a ‘Sacred Outsider’, as I shall characterise the situation of the sangoma and other ritual structural 
strangers in my forthcoming book The Leopard’s Unchanging Spots – the overflow of what I could not 
accommodate for reasons of space and thematic unity in chapter 8. 
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professionalisation of anthropological fieldwork, turning it into the sole hallmark of 
the accomplished anthropologist (with all the disdain this implies vis-à-vis the 
museum anthropologist and the ‘armchair anthropologist’, whose main data set is an 
accumulative collection of localised, processed data, and not the amorphous, 
personal, utterly idiosyncratic field situation), is largely based on an epistemological 
fallacy. Given the power relations that surround anthropological fieldworkers 
(typically doctoral students and postdocs in the first, insecure and dependent half of 
their academic careers, desperately fighting for greater security and independence), 
they cannot make light with the expectations of total immersion and complete loss of 
self that senior, powerful colleagues impose upon them with a mixture of sincerity 
and sadism. Yet the problems of interculturality, in knowledge production, as well as 
in living together or any other human activity, are not solved by pretending to 
assume the other’s identity, but by finding ways of negotiating one’s own identity 
and the other’s in a jointly constructed new situation for which neither of the two 
identities has fully prepared either of the participants in that new situation – the 
solution, in other words, lies in creative innovation negotiating between the various 
inputs and building them into a new, usually ephemeral, cultural product.  
  For ethnography this means that the claims of authenticity and validity based on 
successful and prolonged participation must be doubted just as much as the claims of 
reliability based on extensive, objectifying use of a quantitative, statistical method. 
The only kind of ethnography that could claim some intercultural validity would be 
an intersubjective one in which the ethnographer works closely together, not so 
much with her academic colleagues, but with her hosts, not only in the field (that is 
understood) but especially subsequently, during write-up, publication, distribution 
and marketing of the written product.1  
  Far from taking anthropological procedures and perspectives for granted, the 
chapters in Part II seek to express whatever is left unexpressed and unanalysed, in 
established academic anthropology, in relation to the interaction between the 
researcher and the researched in knowledge production. These chapters explore the 
epistemological, political and existential dimensions that open up once an 
anthropological fieldworker tries to take seriously both the professional prescripts 
for fieldwork, and the perceptions, values and beliefs of the host society. These two 
commitments turn out to be largely incompatible. In these pieces the researcher is 
inevitably taken where, professionally, he has been told he has no business to go, 
and where therefore professional anthropology neither helps him to survive, nor 
escape from. 
1 This is the model that informed the production of my main book on the Nkoya people so far, Tears of Rain; 
cf. van Binsbergen 1992b: Preface and chapter 2, for a discussion of the interactive participatory methods 
making this more than just my own book. A locally affordable Zambian edition was published in 1995 with 




                                                          
  The pieces brought together in Parts II (and to some extent those in Part III) 
convey the message that the production of anthropological knowledge through 
participatory fieldwork is problematic, for a number of reasons including: 
 
• the idiosyncratic nature of the researcher’s experience in the field;  
• the extent to which that experience is influenced by transference from the 
researcher’s individual past – repressed infantile conflicts and desires that inform 
the contact with the local participants and thus partly determine the flow of 
ethnographic information and conceptualisation;1 
• the political, social and economic inequalities attending most interactions 
between representatives of the North and the South; 
• the ethical problematic of temporarily imposing on a host community by means 
of the appropriation of local idioms of sociability (trust, friendship, love, kinship, 
belief, ritual), but for the sake of what ultimately appears to be merely an 
instrumental, Northern-driven and (from the point of view of the host society) 
centrifugal quest for the appropriation of local knowledge. 
 
At the same time these fieldwork situations yet appear to produce intercultural 
knowledge of such detail, such depth, such validity as recognised by the hosts 
themselves, that one would not give up participatory fieldwork as a method despite 
the many pitfalls.  
  The fact that these problems are addressed by reference to my own successive 
field experiences might give the reader the impression that my situation has been 
unique. I think this is not the case. Numerous researchers in the field of religious 
anthropology have identified closely with the beliefs they initially merely came to 
study. A fair number of anthropologists have been initiated into a local ritual status, 
including René Devisch, Matthew Schoffeleers, K. Fidaali, R. Jaulin, Paul Stoller.2 
Their experiences have often been presented, even by themselves, as simple 
strategies of adaptation in the field. This view rendered their claims acceptable in 
professional circles, especially for as long as they remained confined to off-the-
record conversations in the common room of anthropology departments and did not 
appear in print. However, when a researcher has claimed ‘real’ occult experiences 
and a personal belief in their reality and effect, like Paul Stoller, he has had hell to 
1 Recognising such transference and the way it reduces the hosts into instruments of the fieldworker’s neurotic 
attempts at self-realisation, I obviously take a distance now from those passages in Parts II and III that appear 
to present the pursuit of Africanist fieldwork as, primarily, the researcher’s construction of self. At the 
expense of making myself unusually vulnerable I have sought to indicate from autobiographical data how such 
construction of self, although it may yield insights of great profundity and rarety, yet threatens to corrupt the 
pursuit of fieldwork as an intercultural encounter and as a valid form of knowledge construction. I might have 
decided to leave these chapters out of this book. However, their inclusion was imperative in order to 
demonstrate the dangers, but also the possibilities, of intercultural knowledge construction, and the way in 
which intercultural philosophy may guide us here.  
2 Fidaali 1987; Jaulin 1971; Stoller & Olkes 1987; Devisch 1978, 1989; on Schoffeleers see chapter 6. 
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pay.1 The strongest and most extensive claim of occult experiences in recent 
anthropology, that by Carlos Castaneda,2 is at the same time the most ridiculed and 
contested.3  
  The contradictions informing the arguments in Part II are manifest. The chapters’ 
message is that these contradictions cannot be resolved within an anthropological 
discourse. They pose a problem whose solution is suggested to lie in the formulation 
of a philosophy of interculturality, one that allows us to think through the situations 
of intercultural knowledge production within the wider context of intercultural social 
interaction, and that acknowledges the topicality of this problematic in the 
contemporary world of economic, political and cultural globalisation. Thus regarded, 
these chapters do not just deal with the fine points of professional methodology 
among anthropologists – they present a number of laboratory situations of 
interculturality, in all their contradictory complexity; and that, I submit, is their main 
claim to relevance in the context of this book. 
  A recurrent theme in these papers is that social relations are not entered into 
without engagement, without consequences. Especially if these relations, between 
the seeker of intercultural knowledge and the host community about which 
knowledge is being sought, are deliberately modelled after the models of close, 
reciprocal relationships current in the host society. Knowledge, of people and their 
socio-cultural practices, therefore, implies social and political commitment on the 
part of the acquirer of intercultural knowledge. Intercultural knowledge production 
(since it reflects the hegemonic structure of the modern world) is a risky process 
involving either the affirmation or the destruction of the Other’s value and identity. 
Taken literally and to its extreme implications, the anthropological method for the 
production of intercultural knowledge balances between the Scylla of dehumanising 
objectification of the community studied (destruction of the Other, for example by 
etic imposition of alien, North Atlantic analytical models producing merely a 
spurious illusion of local knowledge), and the Charybdis of complete identification 
(destruction of the knowing subject and her scientific research programme, notably 
by ‘going native’ in a total affirmation of the emic). These chapters offer examples 
of both dangers embedded in an extensively described participatory practice.  
  I have just used the conceptual pair of etic and emic – one of the most powerful 
tools of social anthropology. In chapter 15 I will introduce these concepts in the 
following terms:  
‘emic and etic express the distinction between an internal structuring of a cultural orientation 
such as is found in the consciousness of its bearers, on the one hand, and, on the other, a 
structuring that is imposed from the outside. Etic has nothing to do with ethics in the sense of 
the philosophy of the judgement of human action in terms of good and evil. Pike’s terminology 
is based on a linguistic analogy. In linguistics one approaches the description of speech sounds 
1 Cf. Olivier de Sardan 1988. 
2 C. Castaneda 1968, 1971, 1972, 1974, 1977; cf. de Mille 1976, 1980; Murray 1979. 




from two complementary perspectives: that of phonetics (hence -etic), which furnishes a purely 
external description, informed by anatomical and physical parameters, revolving on the air 
vibrations of which the speech sounds consist; and the perspective of phonology, whose basic 
unit of study is the phoneme (adjective: ‘phonemic’, hence -emics): the smallest unit of speech 
sound that is effectively distinguished by language users competent in a particular language, 
basing themselves on the distinctive features of that speech sound. (...) Pike thus codified the 
two-stage analytical stance (both etic and emic) of the classic anthropology that had emerged in 
the second quarter of the twentieth century with such proponents as Malinowski, Evans-
Pritchard, Fortes, Griaule and Leiris.’  
0.1.2. Introducing Part III: From anthropological fieldworker in Southern 
Africa, to North Atlantic diviner-priest: An experiment in intercultural 
philosophy  
At one point in my researcher’s career, it turned out that the only way in which I 
could cope with the contradictions of my professional and existential situation was to 
join the Southern African ecstatic healing cult that formed part of my study object in 
the town of Francistown, Botswana. Thus I effectively became a sangoma diviner-
priest. Part III of the book is entirely devoted to this somewhat exceptional response 
to the methodological and theoretical problems of anthropological fieldwork.  
  In the light of the critique of anthropological fieldwork as a method of 
intercultural knowledge production, it is clear that the agony underlying my 
‘becoming a sangoma’ was in the first place a professional one (although my 
discussion does allow glimpses of a more individual psychological problematic that 
acerbated the professional one shared, in principle, with my anthropological 
colleagues). In my professional education, I had learned to ignore the hermeneutic 
chasm between the represented (the people and their cultural orientation) and the 
representer (myself), and instead to comfort myself with the warmth of sociability as 
a honorary and temporary, but active, member of local African communities. 
Contrary to such expectations, the Francistown people largely rejected me in my role 
of fieldworker because they could not forget that historically I was to them foremost 
an Afrikaner (a White, Afrikaans-speaking Boer in Southern Africa), and hence a 
hereditary enemy. This response could only have the effect of destroying my 
professional habitus, and of reviving all the lifelong insecurities and infantile 
conflicts that I had so far managed to keep covered under the carpet of my successful 
intellectual identity. Deep and great historical pain had forced people in Southern 
Africa to call the fieldworker’s bluff. This was 1988-89, almost two hopeless years 
away from Nelson Mandela’s release from his South African prison cell.  
  In chapter 3, in the discussion of Nkoya female puberty ceremonies, cultural 
boundaries, although hurtful, still managed to produce a delicate balance between 
the researched and the researcher, and to keep intact the conventions of 
anthropological fieldwork as an obvious method of intercultural knowledge 
production, to be taken for granted. But not for long. In subsequent years, covered by 
chapters 5 and 6, I allowed myself to be captured as a patient of Southern African 
sangomas. I recognised in myself a strong desire for the sangomas’ spiritual 
technology and local status and power. Moreover I adopted a political stance that 
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made me see in local ritual and belief an idiom of sociability whose rejection by an 
outsider like myself could only reinforce, instead of redress, the distress and pain 
which North Atlantic conquest has brought to Southern Africa. The third reason to 
become and remain a sangoma has been epistemological: I have reason to suspect 
(as set out in detail in chapter 7) that the North Atlantic truth in these matters – to be 
summarised as  
‘African gods do not exist, and African divination is merely clever impression management’  
– is just a local, parochial, Eurocentric and ethnocentric home truth.1 I came to be 
increasingly convinced that sangomahood constitutes an independent access to valid 
forms of knowledge, even though that African ritual specialism relies on divination, 
other forms of ancestral intervention, and witchcraft beliefs, neither of which – from 
the perspective of North Atlantic scientifically-underpinned common sense – could 
readily correspond with any empirical reality. The fourth reason for my becoming 
and remaining a sangoma lies in the dynamics of interpersonal therapeutic relations 
such as I have engaged in throughout the years as a sangoma, not only in Southern 
Africa, but also transforming that mode of therapy so as to be able to administer a 
globalised format of sangoma therapy worldwide, by means of personal 
consultations and more recently predominantly through electronic mail. In this 
continued practice I am constantly forced to admit that sangoma divination does 
produce valid knowledge which is acknowledged by my clients and then lends such 
an aura of revelatory truth to my subsequent therapeutic directions that many clients 
are able to step out of earlier impasses in their life and at long last release their own 
powers of self-redefinition and regeneration. In other words, I have found in 
sangomahood something that works, and that, at least in my hands and after the 
transformations I have effected upon it, also works beyond the cultural context in 
which I initially found it – it has turned out to work interculturally among 
inhabitants of the North Atlantic, regardless of somatic characteristics or cultural 
background, and even among non-believers and sceptics.  
  Like Part II, Part III largely consists of a researcher’s self-reflexive account of 
his own procedures of knowledge construction. Here a familiar problem arises: that 
of introspection. In fieldwork, the anthropologist is her own principal instrument of 
research. Introspection therefore – although often2 considered a suspect source of 
knowledge – would be the most appropriate method of elucidating these problems. I 
use this method extensively in this book. However, given the enormous influence, 
upon intercultural knowledge production through anthropological fieldwork, of 
idiosyncratic autobiographical contingencies and of transference, the discussion of 
these procedures of knowledge production forces one to dissect rationally and 
1 Harding 1997, cf. 1994; also section 15.5, and van Binsbergen 2001c, 2002b, 2002c. 
2 But not always on good grounds, and not unanimously; on the contrary, throughout the history of philosophy 
introspection has led to brilliant lasting contributions, to which such names are attached as Socrates, Marcus 




                                                          
objectifyingly one’s own contradictory roles, strategies and identities – to the point 
of indecent exposure. There are social and aesthetic limits to the extent to which one 
can do this in print; and I may already have overstepped those.  
  A remarkable tension may be observed in the accounts of my experiences as an 
anthropological fieldworker: even with the best techniques of participant 
observation, applied with the most painful stringency and self-denial, the promise of 
merging between me and the other, as contained in the naïve anthropological 
epistemology, is never fulfilled – since the interpretative distance all the time 
eclipses the existential encounter precisely when the latter is at its most effective. 
Apparently in an attempt to resolve this contradiction symbolically, scattered over 
these accounts is the recurrent image (with tragic echoes of my own childhood) of a 
hieros gamos – a sacred marriage of mythical dimensions (for example between 
heaven and earth, sun and moon, the North Atlantic and the South) that is amply 
prepared and negotiated yet never consummated. In chapter 11 it is the young 
fieldworker’s serene contemplation of the young and happily married Najma bint 
Hassuna, proud mother of four children and proud adept of the cult of the local 
shrine of Sidi Mh ̣ammad. In chapter 3 it is the slightly older fieldworker’s serene 
contemplation of the budding Nkoya girl dancing the coming-out dance that marks 
her attainment of nubility. In chapter 5 it is the significantly older fieldworker’s 
serene contemplation of Jane Sinombe, learner typist, and daughter of the distant 
high priest who a year later would oversee the decisive final steps in my ‘becoming a 
sangoma’. Jane acted as the psychopompos (‘soul guide’) who led me to her father’s 
High God shrine. And in chapters 5 and 6 it is the serene contemplation of 
MmaChakayile, an emaciated alcoholic cult leader approaching the age of seventy, 
but appearing in her trance as the incarnation of beauty and purity, and luring by that 
image the fieldworker over the edge of trance and towards his own locally 
recognised sangomahood. All these may be read, in Jungian terms,2 as occasions 
when the intercultural encounter finds itself transformed into the young hero’s quest 
under the aegis of the maternal archetype, or into an ‘encounter with the anima’; the 
latter is the female archetypal alter ego that lurks in the subconscious and whose 
manifestations across the threshold of consciousness may bring about immensely 
powerful emotions to the point of breakdown of the personality. Lacanians would 
rather recognise here Lacan’s reformulation of the Oedipus complex as an all-
overriding desire of being reunited with the mother.3 The longing to reach the other 
shore, and to leave behind the boiling ocean of intercultural contradictions, sets the 
stage for these raptures, and their account is mainly written not in academic but in 
literary prose. But the quest for the hieros gamos is highly ambivalent in that it is 
instigated not only by the realistic hope of acceptance but also by the mythical 
certainty of rejection; the quest is ultimately designed to fail, not to succeed. Only 
1 And much more so in my novel Een Buik Openen, van Binsbergen 1988a. 
2 Jung 1974b: Part II ch. ii, and 1987. 
3 Lacan 1993. 
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when this insight is finally allowed to register, can the compulsion be broken and the 
researcher escape from the curse of a self-destructive longing for which the 
anthropological fieldwork model only provided the ready vehicle. Here it becomes 
manifest that the personal quest for intercultural knowledge underlying the present 
book is to a considerable extent idiosyncratic, and transference-driven; that its 
insistence on the dissolution of boundaries is not entirely intersubjective and neutral, 
but also reflects a personal neurotic problematic. Though brutal and distortive 
appropriation is argued to form a standard, and regrettable, mode of knowledge 
production in the anthropology of my colleagues, my own alternative and equally 
distortive strategy has been to aspire to be appropriated (accepted, to the point of 
being formally adopted): by the Nkoya and their royal court ceremonial, and by the 
sangomas in Botswana. This ‘quest to have others appropriate me’ now appears as a 
chronic professional disorder, partial recovery from which may only be brought 
about by a change of climate: away from institutionalised anthropology, through a 
migration to the lonely pioneering frontier area of intercultural philosophy, under the 
scorching sun of conceptualisation and rationality, where textual representation 
comes to stand in the place of real-life encounters.  
 
As set out in Chapter 5, I was brought to accept the status of sangoma diviner-
healer-priest which was offered to me, and so I myself have become the certified 
exponent of a local African belief and therapy system. Soon this specialist role was 
to be exercised not only in Botswana but also in the North Atlantic, in combination 
even with a professorial chair in anthropology. Inevitably I found myself caught in 
all sorts of epistemological, social, medical and legal dilemmas; a meticulous 
discussion of these dilemmas (in the other chapters of Part III) allows us to draw the 
intercultural lessons from becoming a sangoma. Instead of being a merely 
performative leap into anti-intellectualist obscurantism inspired by shallow and 
guilt-ridden feelings of intercontinental solidarity, the intercultural adoption and 
practice of a local system of belief and ritual forces us (according to the argument in 
chapter 7) to address explicitly the contradictions inherent in established North 
Atlantic procedures of intercultural knowledge production. Not only does Part III 
challenge, on political grounds, the common condescending assumption, among 
North Atlantic students of African religion that reductionist deconstruction is their 
only permissible analytical stance. Proceeding from the political to the 
epistemological domain, the argument of chapter 7 leads us to suspect that, when an 
independent epistemology outside the North Atlantic (like the sangomas’ epistemol-
ogy) acknowledges sources of knowledge not recognised in North Atlantic 
scientifically underpinned convictions, recognition in itself may bring these sources 
to flow and to yield valid knowledge. We are thus reminded of the dangers attached 
to any attempt to think interculturality along lines of conceptualisation and 
epistemology exclusively set by North Atlantic intellectual traditions.  
  Chapter 5, drafted in 1990, still takes for granted the naïve anthropological 




                                                          
faithful representation by total identification and immersion), only to protest against 
it; as if I was saying to myself:  
‘If I am not allowed to join my hosts as an anthropologist, let me go for even more total 
identification, and try to become like them even in ways that are incompatible with my habitus 
as an empirical scientist.’  
The subsequent chapters in Part III record the continued struggle with the 
contradictions inherent in such an attitude. This inevitably raised the question of 
integrity.  
  ‘Is integrity at all a viable concept in intercultural situations?’, I ask in chapter 6, 
where I deal at length with the apparent contradiction embodied in my position as a 
North Atlantic White who is both a university professor and a sangoma. The answer 
is hard to give, because the very notion of integrity conveys the sense of the 
monolithic – one person, one culture, one commitment, one standard to measure 
them by. In a globalised context, where values and other cultural contents are 
flowing as much as people and commodities, and many boundaries are dissolving, 
integrity may not be the most obvious concept to assess the value of ideas, of 
actions, of a person. Instead, I have tried to render my own claims to integrity in the 
field of sangomahood susceptible to debate by offering a detailed discussion of 
background, contradictions, personal aspirations and doubts, thus at least giving 
signs of the earnestness, and of the willingness to make myself vulnerable, that in 
many mono-cultural settings are taken for signs of integrity. The central lesson is 
this chapter is that integrity (best exemplified by the closed, bounded, integrated, and 
lineal characteristics of the book as the central symbol of North Atlantic civilisa-
tion)1 can only be realised, be thought, within any one cultural orientation, and not at 
the intersection between such orientations, not interculturally. This disturbing 
thought implicitly threatens to defeat the whole of the present book’s project: 
seeking to derive lessons from intercultural situations, it cannot aspire to the kind of 
shining integrity so blissfully waiting for philosophers who have wisely (?) stuck to 
one cultural orientation – their own. This abyss opening up in chapter 6 may be 
identical to the one concerning knowledge in chapter 7: there, an examination of the 
implication of the common (although – as I admit there – not totally state-of-the-art) 
definition of knowledge as ‘justified true belief’ reveals that – just like integrity – 
also knowledge can very well be defined and assessed within one cultural 
orientation, but becomes an extremely complex and contradictory concept when 
applied interculturally. It appears as if this book’s project, whose integrity has first 
been recognised to be inherently problematic, must also give up almost all hope of 
producing valid intercultural knowledge– a somewhat depressing thought in a book 
whose focus is the philosophy of interculturality.  
  However, chapters 6, 7 and 8 also offer other, more dynamic, solutions to the 
problem of intercultural integrity: if sangomahood is a responsibility to insert 
1 In chapters 13 and 15 I come back to the book model as informing our taken-for-granted contemporary 
notions of ‘culture’. 
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oneself into the stream of life force and to assist others in doing so, and if this is to 
bring about the transformation of death into life on which sangomahood revolves, 
then it cannot remain a learned lesson faithfully and punctually brought into practice. 
On the contrary, its claims to integrity have to be assessed by a different standard, 
notably by the extent to which the sangoma manages to realise such transformation 
in the sense of redefining sangomahood into a new and viable form. In chapter 7 the 
details of such transformation are presented and analysed with both frankness and 
confidence when I deal with my attempts to create and mediate a sangomahood that 
has a global format and uses the Internet as its vehicle. The earlier abyss of 
multiculturality into which integrity and knowledge threatened to sink, is argued to 
be chimerical, an artefact of the boundary imposition we are tempted to engage in for 
geopolitical, hegemonic reasons. Instead, a unitary epistemology is argued to create 
the possibility of an intercultural truth that renders (epistemological, and cultural) 
relativism an obsolete position.  
  The anti-relativist thinker proclaims to measure all cultural orientations, even the 
weakest in terms of power and numbers, even the one whose bearers have undergone 
the greatest historical wrongs, by a common standard that has global validity and 
applicability. This is the reason why, despite my awareness of what is considered 
politically correct and intercontinentally polite today, I refuse to give in to familiar 
North–South pressures that often turn global intellectual debate into a popularity 
contest, and shun from engaging in real incisive debate with Southern colleagues. 
However, I take my African colleagues, be they social scientists, historians, 
philosophers or sangomas, as seriously as I take myself. Therefore, it is my historical 
duty to engage in free and open debate with them – not because I deny their and their 
ancestors’ historical pain (I acknowledge that pain especially in chapters 4, 5, 6 and 
14 – I come from my own history of under-privilege, and know suffering on that 
basis; and I have been publicly chosen to be a servant of ancestors both European 
and African), but because any other attitude on my part would perpetuate and 
aggravate their greatest pain: being excluded from common humanity. This is why, 
at various points in the present book, I viciously fight condescension in the North–
South debate; and this is why, at other points in this book, and in my other works, I 
engage in critical debate with distinguished and esteemed African colleagues such as 
Gyekye, Mazrui, Ramose, Oruka, Mudimbe – or, for that matter, with an Asian-born 
intercultural philosopher like Mall.  
  In the late 1990s I could still write:  
‘The surplus value which sangomahood yet holds for me, has also been the reason why in later 
years I could not bring myself to probe into the epistemological status of my sangoma 
knowledge and of the representations of the supernatural that sangomahood entails.’1  
Do I truly believe in the tenets of Nkoya witchcraft and kingship which I act out in 
Zambia? Do I truly believe in the sangoma world view which I act out in Botswana, 




the Netherlands, and worldwide on the Internet? For many years I have postponed 
facing up to these obvious and legitimate questions, because I felt that any attempt to 
discursively answer these questions, would take me back to the condescending, 
deconstructivist anthropological stance I had hoped to escape from by ‘becoming a 
sangoma’.  
  I have in the meantime realised that this was leaving the thinking of and about 
sangoma half-way undone, so that the lessons this process contains for 
interculturality would not be allowed to be articulated – as if I was running away 
from them myself. I have since, in newly written chapters 7 and 8, remedied the 
epistemological vacuum surrounding my earlier view of sangomahood. This helped 
me to develop and express the view that the self-evident relativism informing my 
earlier pieces on sangomahood threatened to defeat my entire intercultural project; in 
the place of relativism, I now propose a non-relativist unitary epistemology in line 
with my adage (most fully developed in the concluding chapter 15) that ‘cultures do 
not exist’.  
  Chapter 15 (1999) presents the proud tour de force in which such an overall 
theoretical perspective is being attempted, in an argument that reaches back to many 
of the preceding chapters, and thus offers a fitting conclusion for the book as a 
whole. It is important that that argument emphatically identifies as an exercise in 
intercultural philosophy; for I repeat, a resolution of the contradictions of 
intercultural knowledge production brought out in Parts II and III could not be 
reached within the anthropological discourse but only in some meta-discourse such 
as intercultural philosophy. (In chapter 12, I will even go so far as to claim – in 
challenge to the pioneering intercultural philosopher R.A. Mall – that no such 
resolution is likely to be achieved in any language-based discourse, but only in non-
lingual or peripherally-lingual practices.) At any rate, being a programmatic and 
polemical overview, written moreover at the very beginning of my practice as an 
intercultural philosopher, limitations adhere to chapter 15 which could not be 
remedied there without destroying that chapter’s manifestly effective argument, and 
which instead have been in part compensated in the most recently written chapters. 
  One of the principal reasons the North Atlantic region has had both for studying 
‘other cultures’, and for reifying these as absolutely and insurmountably different, 
has been: to allow North Atlantic civilisation to construct itself on the basis of a 
claim of a rationality and science incomparably superior to the thought processes 
engaged in by humans in other continents. One of the tasks of intercultural 
philosophy is then to explode such hegemonic projection from the North Atlantic. 
Intercultural philosophy can do so by taking seriously the human thought processes 
elsewhere, by approaching in their own right the belief systems based on them, and 
particularly by exposing the geopolitical, class, gender, racial, and other collective 
interests that have imposed the violence of boundaries between subsets of 
humankind in the first place. Clearly, here lie enormous problems that a substantial 
literature on belief, rationality, and interculturality has helped us to appreciate. To 




• my own extensive and painful confrontation as an anthropologist with non-
Western world views in a number of fieldwork settings;  
• my long-standing practice of one non-Western knowledge system as a sangoma; 
• my extensive evidence that knowledge sources not recognised by North Atlantic 
science can yet yield valid knowledge;  
• my attempt to formulate a non-relativist unitary epistemology; 
• and my long-ranging historical and comparative analyses that help establish the 
empirical conditions which underpin my claims that ‘cultures do not exist’, that 
all human knowledge production is interconnected and therefore subjected to a 
converging epistemology. 
 
  Chapter 7 comes closest to unfolding the epistemological problems that 
sangomahood poses. It presents an argument in which the extrasensory knowledge 
apparently produced by sangoma divination can be appreciated to be just that, in the 
context of a wider argument about the structure of the world beyond the boundary 
conditions constituting sensorialist rationality. In this way it argues the importance 
of the study of cultural orientations outside the North Atlantic region: not only for 
reasons of equality, recognition, and some sort of preservation of biodiversity in the 
field of culture, but also for a fourth reason that is neither political, nor emotional, 
nor humanitarian. This reason is simply the following: sensorialist rationality has so 
restricted the sources of knowledge which are recognised and admissible in the 
North Atlantic and global contexts, that other cultural orientations’ familiarity with 
other sources of knowledge, and with the procedures – the mental technologies – of 
tapping these sources, will add immensely to humanity’s knowledge about the world 
and about itself.  
  Chapter 8 originated in my personal experiences as a researcher and sangoma, 
and this lends the specific structure and tension to the chapter. At the culmination of 
my initiation as a sangoma, I re-visited the Nata shrine of the High God Mwali in 
northern Botswana, and here was confronted with two riddles. One concerned the 
self-proclaimed identity of the shrine’s high priest as ‘Mbedzi’; the other concerned 
the identity that was there unexpectedly imposed upon me: of – allegedly – 
belonging to a ‘kind of people whose traditional dress is the leopard skin’.  
  For the first riddle, an answer presents itself with my discovery of historical 
cultic relations between the South Central African Mwali cult, and the great religions 
of South Asia.  
  The second riddle proved far less easy to answer. After an initial, abortive survey 
of identity construction through leopard symbolism in Europe, South Africa, and 
South Central Africa, I embarked on a pain-staking analysis across three continents, 
and with a time range from the Upper Palaeolithic to the present day. I carefully 
trace leopard symbolism in sub-Saharan Africa; in the Eastern Mediterranean basin 




                                                          
Judaism and Islam); Ancient Egypt;1 and Asia (with special attention to India and 
China). In the process, I paid considerable attention to ancient astronomies as 
relatively well-documented and enduring formal systems yielding the kind of 
historical and comparative data we need in order to make sense of leopard 
symbolism in space and time. At long last I did find the answer to the second riddle, 
and again it points to massive Indian influence on South Central African cults. The 
obligation to wear a leopard skin turns out to be rooted in the legal requirement, 
stipulated in the Hindu Institutes of Vishnu from the early first millennium CE, for 
religious students of Kshatriya (warrior) caste status to wear a tiger skin. When I hit 
upon this text passage, the earlier part of my quest had already made me aware of the 
symbolic equivalence, grosso modo, of leopard and tiger in much of Asia.  
  But meanwhile, far more comprehensive patterns of continuity and differentia-
tion throughout the cultural history of the Old World2 had become discernible, 
enabling me to situate sangomahood in great detail, and with great scope in space 
and time, within the Old World’s evolving cultural history of symbolism, 
spirituality, and shamanism. During fourteen months from late Spring, 2002, I 
postponed the publication of Intercultural encounters in order to complete this new 
quest. I collected the scattered and fragmented data from such diverse disciplines as 
comparative linguistics, archaeology, anthropology, even genetics; reconciled the 
inevitable contradictions between these disciplines, their paradigms and their 
findings; straightened out the complex methodological requirements of such a quest; 
and wrote out my results – into what was originally (like chapter 7) an afterthought 
to chapter 6, but effectively turned out to be another, fully-fledged book in its own 
right. Incorporating that book here would have had the advantage of meaningfully 
pursuing the line of argument on sangomahood and bringing it to its ultimate 
conclusion. However, doing so would not only make the book absolutely unman-
ageable in size, but – with such a massive imput of original empirical historical 
research – would also detract from the, at times already shaky, intercultural 
philosophical orientation of the present book. So the reader must inevitably miss, in 
this book, my final objectifying account of sangomahood, in which I draw the 
detailed and world-wide cultural historical lessons of my fifteen years of immersion 
in this spiritual idiom. But the companion volume The Leopard’s Unchanging Spots: 
Towards a World History of Shamanism from the Perspective of the Southern 
1 I will capitalise ‘Ancient’ when it designates a specific civilisation that flourished in previous millennia and 
has no direct continuity with the present, e.g. ‘Ancient Egypt’, ‘Ancient Mesopotamia’.  
2 By ‘Old World’, I mean Africa, Asia and Europe, regardless of historical period. The term is not meant to 
exclude the inhabitants of Oceania, Australia, and the Americas from the mainstream of human cultural 
history, but simply to admit that, largely as a result of research undertaken over the past hundred years, the 
global collectivity of scholars involved in the production of scientific knowledge happens to be best (but still 
very imperfectly) informed with regard to historical processes, and their interrelations, in Africa, Asia and 
Europe. And of course, distinguishing these three continents as if they were viable units of cultural history, 
and linking them into a comprehensive Old World, reflects a late modern geopolitics that is greatly influenced 
by North Atlantic hegemony. 
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African Sangoma Cult has already been drafted in full, and, given time, health, and 
ancestral assistance, will be out before long.  
0.1.3. Introducing Part IV: ‘From cultural anthropology to intercultural 
philosophy’ 
Meanwhile, participatory fieldwork as reported in localising and particularising 
monographs is not the only procedure of intercultural knowledge production open to 
the Africanist anthropologist. Comparative and historical work offers additional 
approaches, ultimately relying, at least in part, upon the knowledge construction 
through fieldwork but not necessarily marred by the latter’s contradictions. Some of 
these approaches are pursued in Part IV. 
  These chapters explore, in broad general terms drawing examples from many 
different local linguistic and cultural settings in Africa, some of the basic 
technologies of sociability and anti-sociability around which African community life 
can be said to be organised: reconciliation and witchcraft.1 It is the attempt at 
generalisation that allows these chapters to steer the argument away from the pitfalls 
of idiosyncrasy, identification and transference that form the great themes in Part II 
and III. What emerges is, in the first place, exercises in intercultural explanation, not 
primarily at the emic level of faithfully rendered local concepts and texts but at the 
etic level of the distancing description of enduring structures, procedures and social 
technologies. Here a number of basic tools of analysis are deployed and shown to go 
some way towards a structural, generalising understanding of African situations: 
such concepts as cosmology, virtuality, the village, community, globalisation, 
kinship, class, and class conflict.  
  Along these lines, chapter 9 discusses – inspired by Kant’s theory of sensus 
communis as springing from aesthetic judgement – symbolic production as 
affirmation of either universalist or particularist constructions of community, on the 
basis of ethnographic material from the Nkoya people of western central Zambia.  
  Chapter 10 considers the production of knowledge and of ignorance under the 
specific politics of intercultural knowledge production obtaining in the same part of 
Africa in the context of international development intervention. 
  Chapter 11 (on reconciliation) presents:  
 
(a) a model of an African hermeneutic social technology (that of reconciliation, on 
the basis not of demonstrable legal principles but of the invention of points of 
agreement, more or less by sleight-of-hand but still within a given socio-cultural 
framework) that, in its turn, can serve  
(b) as a model of intercultural knowledge production in general.  
 
1 I would have preferred to be able to offset, in this book, chapter 11 on reconciliation against my recent piece 
on ‘Witchcraft as virtualised boundary condition of the kinship order’ (van Binsbergen 2001b), but this 




  Much of the sting may be taken out of the methodological and epistemological 
problems presented in Parts II and III once we realise that intercultural knowledge is, 
in the first place, representation: a hermeneutics that at best indicates, obliquely, 
many of the basic traits of the original, but yet always produces a secondary product 
that is essentially new, different, and distorted. Intercultural knowledge production, 
therefore, is a form of mediation closely resembling African reconciliation: it is not 
necessarily truthful, cannot even claim or afford to be totally truthful, yet it works, in 
the sense that it demonstrably informs and supports a social practice much in the 
way that an anthropological fieldworker’s intercultural knowledge is demonstrated 
to work when it allows her to elicit progressively positive and supportive recogn-
itions of sociability on the part of the host community. 
  Here lies the transition to Part V, towards an intercultural philosophical 
orientation rather than an anthropological orientation.  
0.1.4. Introducing Part V: Exercises in intercultural philosophy 
It is with a certain reluctance and nostalgia that I make this transition towards Part V.  
  Crossing from anthropology to philosophy has enhanced my awareness of the 
philosophy of science and of epistemology; it certainly made me appreciate more 
clearly whatever was wrong with the kind of anthropology I had engaged in until 
then, and it has given me some of the tools needed to articulate that insight. Yet I 
cannot bring myself to distance myself completely from my earlier scientific work, 
with all the long years of painstaking and passionate research and writing this has 
involved. I may have become a philosopher, of sorts, but I remain an empirical 
scientist. I cannot jettison the truth procedures that, however critically assessed and 
renewed, constitute my identity, my habitus and ethos, as a scientist. This is not to 
say that in the last analysis every philosophical argument is to undergo an empirical 
test. But, at any rate, those aspects of a philosophical argument that directly amount 
to a statement about empirical reality, or that imply such a statement (and on second 
thoughts, most philosophical statements have such implications, certainly indirectly), 
must be treated with the same procedural carefulness developed within the empirical 
sciences (be they natural or social).  
  Most of my philosophical colleagues are philosophers in the first place. Ever 
since they were adolescents, they have spent their life exposing themselves to the 
canonised literature of philosophy. They did not build up an oeuvre and a name as 
empirical scientists. They can afford to be primarily concerned, not with the 
empirical grounding of their arguments, but with the latter’s conceptual and 
discursive formal correctness and elegance. Here the dextrous and detailed reference 
to the ideas of great philosophers is often the hallmark of professionalism and a 
major factor in the authority accorded to my colleagues’ arguments. In the last few 
years, I have learned to imitate them somewhat in these respects. After all, I am an 
experienced fieldworker who has mastered the art of picking up a local cultural 
orientation and emulating it in his own behaviour and speech. There is no reason 
why I could not apply the same technique after shifting my fieldwork location to the 
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Rotterdam philosophical faculty – an ironical statement, of course, because I moved 
in order to become something other than a fieldworker, and to be a colleague, not an 
observer, of the local philosophers. Yet of course my reading, for decades, has been 
largely in a very different direction from that of my philosophical colleagues, and I 
will never be able to catch up in this respect. This is one of the reasons why my 
work, even if intended as philosophical, inevitably continues to display the 
hallmarks of a stranger and outsider in the eyes of my philosophical colleagues. 
Another reason is that my empirical bias forces me to acknowledge, in all sorts of 
arguments, the empirically given situation (often a concrete intercultural situation 
whose contradictions and complexities I have lived through myself, and which has 
helped to shape me as a person) as a compelling constraint upon my freedom to 
generate statements. By contrast, my philosophical colleagues tend to opt for a much 
greater independent creativity in conceptualising and rendering reality, in 
combination with a much greater fidelity (informed by their much greater erudition) 
vis-à-vis the canonical philosophical literature. Their assumption appears to be that 
in the last analysis a philosophical argument should not allow itself to be dictated by 
empirical reality; my point of departure, on the other hand, is that a philosophical 
argument which demonstrably does not submit to being compelled by empirical 
reality, particularly not by a personally-lived-through reality, is uninteresting and 
futile. As a result (and I make this claim extensively in chapter 15), philosophy in 
my hands comes close to being an empirical subject once more,1 and occasionally 
comes close even to being an autobiographical confession and apology. The 
difference in style between my own writing and that of my philosophical colleagues 
is unmistakable and occasionally produces misunderstanding and irritations both in 
them and in myself. This is part of the peculiar position I have come to occupy 
between disciplines, and I have given up trying to disguise it with ever more reading, 
ever more erudite window-dressing. I might even co-opt one of the greatest philos-
ophers in the Western tradition to my side, tendentiously reading Plato’s exhortation 
of sōízein ta phainómena (‘doing justice to evident manifestations’ – commonly 
interpreted as having only one very narrow reference in connection with the 
movements of planets against the night sky) as an empiricist credo; in a way it is 
one, after all.  
  Reluctant, nostalgic – yes, but only up to a point. For it has been my own free 
choice – and a felicitous one – to try and confront in intercultural philosophy the 
dilemmas that oppressed me in anthropology, and so in Part V the book’s central 
problems are addressed not so much in an evocative or empirical way (as in the 
preceding Parts) but in a discursive manner: what is the nature of intercultural 
knowledge? And under what conditions can reliable, valid and relevant knowledge 
be produced across (what is commonly taken to be) cultural boundaries?  
1 ‘Once more’, for this is how the Western philosophical tradition started out in the first place, with the 




  Intercultural philosophy represents a discourse ideally capable of identifying and 
supplanting the defective models of thought and the naïve epistemologies with 
which I, for one, began to produce intercultural knowledge as a budding 
anthropologist. It alerts us to the performative nature of identity claims, and helps us 
to deconstruct ‘culture’, and especially ‘cultures’ and ‘cultural boundaries’. This is 
the case even though the concept of culture has come to constitute one of the most 
powerful collective representations of the contemporary world (particularly the 
North Atlantic region); by its very political nature, this concept must be distrusted as 
a self-evident tool of detached philosophical analysis. In intercultural knowledge 
production, the distortive effects of projection and transference are obvious; but 
intercultural philosophy reminds us that also identification, even identification for 
the best reasons of political solidarity, does not necessarily lead to statements that 
are logically and conceptually compelling, as well as empirically sustainable, in 
other words, that are true. At the same time it forces us to reflect on the possible 
cultural limits of any truth claims, and to explore the epistemological and conceptual 
conditions under which truth could be (must be) established interculturally.  
  Situated at a discursive plane where (and that is the great advantage of the 
transition from cultural anthropology to intercultural philosophy) abstraction has 
been made from specific personal experiences and the idiosyncrasies of 
anthropological fieldwork situations, and having already above preluded upon the 
contents and strategic contribution of some of these chapters making up Part V, their 
specific arguments do not require much more introduction than they give themselves 
in their opening sections.  
  Chapter 12 deals with the theoretical problems raised by globalisation and the 
possibility of an intercultural hermeneutics as proposed by R.A. Mall, the leading 
intercultural philosopher in Germany. I identify globalisation as a central problem 
for intercultural philosophy. Philosophy is the dialogical development of a special 
language that expresses, in an innovative yet intersubjective manner, aporias of the 
human experience as characteristic of the philosopher’s own historical situation 
(although such expression usually includes references to other times and other 
places). Philosophy thus roots in a concrete spatio-temporal collective situation, 
whence it derives its empirical impetus and its touchstone. The empirical 
investigation of globalisation is obviously not the philosopher’s task, but a spate of 
recent empirical research demonstrates that globalisation does indeed entail 
profound changes and has far-reaching effects. It does create crucial aporias in the 
contemporary experience awaiting philosophical exploration. After sketching a 
framework in which these aporias can be appreciated in relation to one another, I 
turn to Mall’s intercultural hermeneutics as a major attempt to face up to this 
philosophical challenge. The critique of Mall’s approach helps to situate him and his 
work in the global space that – in a way he does not self-reflexively problematise – 
constitutes his obvious habitat, and brings us to formulate a number of research 
priorities for the investigation of interculturality: the nature of culture and cultures, 
the possibility of intercultural communication (fact or wishful thinking?), and the 
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role of language as a violent, estrangingly divisive, tool precisely when utilised for 
thinking interculturality.  
  Chapter 13 seeks to define a theoretical framework within which the expansion 
of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in Africa can be understood 
from an intercultural philosophical perspective, and with emphasis on Africa. What 
is the place of ICT in Africa, and what is the place of Africa in a world increasingly 
dominated by ICT? In this chapter’s argument I seek to explode the apparent 
contradiction between Africa and ICT. I do so by a two-step argument. In the first 
part I confront African thinkers like Mazrui and Gyekye, who have argued that 
African culture and ICT are incompatible. Here three two-tiered statements are 
discussed and largely dismissed:  
 
(1) (a) ICT is owned by the North, and hence (b) ICT is irreconcilably opposed to 
African culture; 
(2) (a) ICT is metalocal world culture, without local specificity and local validity, in 
other words owned by everyone and no one, and hence (b) ICT is in principle 
devastating for any localising cultural identity owned by a specific set of people, 
such as the African identity; 
(3) (a) ICT is inimical to culture as owned by a specific set of people, and hence (b) 
ICT is inimical to the African culture or cultures and to the sets of people that 
claim ownership of the latter.  
 
Having advanced a philosophical argument to the effect that ICT is just as much and 
as little owned by Africans as by any other collectivity in the contemporary world, I 
proceed in the second part of the chapter with a more empirical argument setting 
forth some of the ways in which the African appropriation of ICT is actually taking 
shape.  
  Chapter 14 brings out the complexities that arise once philosophical concepts are 
taken out of the ivory tower and applied to the rich empirical reality of African 
societies. An empirical corrective is then absolutely necessary, and especially a 
corrective from the social sciences: one that does not just consider (like most 
philosophers do) the individual person and his rationality. Set against the 
background of my personal intellectual and political itinerary, the argument explores 
the contents, the format and societal locus of the concept of ubuntu as propounded 
by academic philosophers, managers and politicians in Southern Africa today. The 
concept’s utopian and prophetic nature is recognised. This allows us to see a 
considerable positive application for it at the centre of the globalised urban societies 
of Southern Africa today. Ubuntu philosophy is argued to constitute not a straight-
forward emic rendering of a pre-existing African philosophy available since times 
immemorial in the various languages belonging to the Bantu language family. 
Instead, ubuntu philosophy is a remote etic reconstruction, in an alien globalised 
format, of a set of implied ideas that do inform aspects of village and kin relations in 




is difficult to gauge. Their original format differs greatly from the academic 
codifications of ubuntu. After highlighting the anatomy of reconciliation, the role of 
intellectuals, and the globalisation of Southern African society, the argument 
concludes with an examination of the potential dangers of ubuntu: mystifying real 
conflict, perpetuating resentment (as in the case of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission), and obscuring the excessive pursuit of individual gain. 
Finally, the potential released by ubuntu will be brought to bear on this argument 
itself, in a bid to overcome what otherwise might appear to be merely a stalemate 
between South and North intellectual production, and a replaying of classic moves 
familiar from the Gadamer/Habermas debate on tradition and the critique of 
ideology. 
  The somewhat more systematic outlines of an intercultural philosophy are 
primarily explored in the concluding, ambitious chapter 15. Based on my 1999 
inaugural lecture at the Erasmus University, this argument presents the outline of a 
research programme that may yet reap the positive benefits of the intellectual and 
existential struggle evoked in Parts II and III of this book. In chapter 15, I seek to 
explode a fair number of self-evidences that have so far haunted the investigation of 
interculturality and that, as far as I am concerned, should all be discarded if any 
progress is to be made in intercultural philosophy. I am particularly addressing the 
following illusory assumptions:  
 
• that ‘cultures’ (plural) do exist;  
• that identities proclaimed within the public arenas of the contemporary 
multicultural society are authentic and free from performativity;  
• that everyone has one and only one culture, and is inevitably tied to that one;  
• that it is meaningful to speak of intercultural philosophy in the sense of 
comparing the ways various philosophical traditions of the world have dealt with 
perennial themes (such as the nature of world, the person, morality, time, force, 
life) without first investigating the conditions and the distortions of 
interculturality as such;  
• that philosophy can afford to ignore empirical evidence as produced by the social 
and natural sciences;  
• that Africa is a patchwork quilt of discrete, localised, bounded cultures;  
• that ethnography is ipso faco a valid form of intercultural knowledge production;  
• that intercultural philosophy as it has been pioneered over the past decade has 
already substantiated its claims of constituting a valid form of intercultural 
knowledge;  
• that in cultural analysis we can afford to ignore comprehensive long-range 
correspondences in space and time, across millennia and across thousands of 
miles;  
• that Greece is the cradle of the North Atlantic, and subsequently global, 
civilisation;  
• and that cultural fragmentation is the original condition of humankind instead of 
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a secondary product of historical group interaction.  
 
  Even despite the fireworks of chapter 15, I must resign myself to the fact that this 
book offers, not an accomplished and elaborate philosophy of interculturality, but 
the fragmented yet sustained lessons from a lifelong quest to arrive at an 
intercultural knowledge that is both scientific and existential, both empathic and 
politically responsible, both emic and etic, that addresses both the mind and the 
heart, and that shuns North Atlantic hegemonic imposition and instead seeks to open 
up new forms of valid knowledge that are available elsewhere and that yet share in 
the same common regime of truth.  
  It is not in the first place for lack of ability, or lack of familiarity with an 
established discursive format in either anthropology or philosophy, that my leading 
ideas appear scattered over the book, with the dynamics of their emergence over 
decades still clinging to them, and always near to the specific empirical context in 
which they happened to present themselves as puzzles and challenges to myself. 
Merely summarising, in an abstract manner, the insights to which this complex 
trajectory has led me, without allowing the reader to tread this trajectory for herself, 
would have been pointless. This book is a pioneering work. Let it be as tantalising to 
read as it has been for me to write. I propose it be treated as prolegomena, that will 
help us to construct a proper abstract theory of interculturality, but only after the 
present book’s explorations and contradictions have made us aware of at least some 
of interculturality’s complexities and pitfalls.  
  Finally, what does come through clearly in the intercultural philosophical 
exercises that make up the last Part of this book, is the need for particular kinds of 
dynamic, alternative logic – capable of acknowledging difference without 
entrenching itself in difference. In the world today, the practical logic underlying 
such actual intercultural encounters as make up the reality of our globalised social 
world, is characterised by kaleidoscopic fragmentation, inconsistence, pluriformity. 
Here – whatever their theoretical claims to universality – logical connections based 
on concepts and their relations have in practice only a limited, local validity, beyond 
which other such connections, of rather different relational content between rather 
different concepts, hold sway.  
  The increasing devastation of social, political and economic life on the African 
continent; the hardening of enemy stereotypes between, on the one hand, North 
Atlantic governments and part of their subjects, on the other hand an increasingly 
vocal Islam that continues to expand in Europe and Africa; the incapability of 
solving the Palestinian conflict and, instead, the creation of more and more scenes of 
war, violence, and historical cicatrisation and humiliation in the Middle East and (on 
11 September 2001) on the USA eastern seaboard – these developments are the 
result, not simply of a universal human condition, but (among other factors) of the 
failure of North Atlantic hegemonic pretensions of universality, rationality and 




                                                          
contentious Clash of Civilizations1 (now the received wisdom at the Foreign Offices 
of Washington, London and even The Hague) is largely an artefact of the unitary and 
ethnocentric illusion, as if one consistent logic connecting one well-defined set of 
concepts would already be capable of encompassing the totality of contemporary 
experiences world-wide. Ultimately supported by such arrogance as North Atlantic 
security and weaponry seemed to afford until recently, it is an entrenched, bookish 
pipe-dream, a fallacy in practical intercultural logic, even more than a fallacy of 
cultural and ethnic theoretical analysis (which it is also, as chapter 15 suffices to 
bring out).  
  If North Atlantic hegemony constructs the contemporary world in terms of hard 
binary oppositions (as is commensurate with the logic of the formal organisations, 
the legal texts, and the weapons technology in which North Atlantic power and 
identity are largely invested), then the reactions from the rest of the world can only 
be of two kinds:  
 
• either a crumbling away in the face of such conceptual violence (as in the 
case of Africa today),  
• or a head-on confrontation through an equally intransigent conceptual 
counter-violence, as in the case of Islam today.  
 
  Physical violence including war are only possible if justified and sustained by 
conceptual violence, however dim and crude. In intercultural situations, conceptual 
violence invariably implies the violence of representation, since it is only after a 
translation into terms more familiar to us that we can conceptualise the cultural 
Other.  
  Of the violence of representation, and of the tendency for it to absorb, through 
transference, infantile conflicts which can only warp the validity of intercultural 
representation and render it even more violent than it inevitably has to be, this book 
offers many detailed examples – at the expense of making its author (reverting to a 
form of relentless presentation of self which is normally reserved for the field of 
belles lettres) exceptionally vulnerable, as an anthropologist, as a philosopher, and as 
a human being struggling for integrity, insight, true human encounter, liberation 
from the burdens of the past, love.  
  But on the positive side, this book does indicate some of the directions in which 
such dynamic, alternative logics may be found:  
 
• in Derridean deconstruction and différance;  
• in Lévistraussian savage thought, which (whether we intellectuals like it or 
not) is the inconsistent standard mode of thought of most human beings in 
most situations world-wide, and also of ourselves unless we are in a 
specifically marked technical academic mode;  
1 Cf. Huntington 1996. 
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• in dialogue;  
• in the mythomaniacal logic of association and projection that a century of 
psychoanalysis has taught us to recognise and that we should first of all use, 
not condescendingly and gleefully to detect the transference in other’s 
behaviour, but self-critically, to identify such transference in our own 
construction of knowledge;  
• in African techniques of reconciliation through creative and selective 
hermeneutics;  
• in intercultural hermeneutics for which both cultural anthropology and 
intercultural philosophy, despite all their shortcomings as highlighted in this 
book, have proposed promising models and methods in the course of the 
twentieth century CE;  
• in the notion, repeatedly employed in this book, of a field of tension that 
acknowledges difference without allowing the matter at hand to be entirely 
reduced to such difference;  
• and (as best brought out in chapter 14) in a humility which, while recognising 
the violent bases of both its own and the Other’s attempts at representation, 
continues to insist on the construction of a domain of encounter where not 
mutual violence, but sympathethic respect for each other’s personal and 
collective pain guides our actions, grants us the promise of integrity, and 
allows us to recognise, and live (even beyond words), our shared humanity.  
 
Only after we have sincerely explored and applied such customised and local logics, 
can we hope to surpass them and construct, beyond them (along such lines as 
proposed in chapter 7), a domain where the philosopher’s and the scientist’s hope of 
a unitary, non-relativist logic encompassing the totality of the contemporary human 
experience, may be more than a hegemonic imposition.  
0.2. Provenance of chapters, and acknowledgements 
Most chapters of the present book were previously published, either in English or in 
Dutch. All previously published texts have been very extensively revised, expanded 
and updated, in order to serve a number of purposes: the concern to reflect my 
current thinking; the concern to reflect developments in the various academic 
disciplines involved and in the world at large since the text was first drafted; and the 
concern to avoid at least some of the most striking repetitions and contradictions 
throughout the book. The book is therefore not a historically faithful reflection of my 
thinking and writing at any moment in the past, even though the chapter titles 
indicate the year in which a chapter’s argument was first conceived. The book is a 
thematic treatment of related issues that happen to have a long history in my thinking 
and writing yet culminate in the present more or less sustained argument, fragmented 
though it is over fifteen chapters and an Introduction. Readers (if any) interested in 




                                                          
publications. Only occasionally, when unmarked updating would have destroyed the 
structure of an earlier argument, have I left the text largely unchanged and instead 
added a footnote stating my current views or a current state of affairs.  
  However, I have not systematically projected my later views onto the earlier 
pieces. Thus it is only obvious that the notion of culture I am using in the older 
chapters is far more in line with mainstream anthropology of the last quarter of the 
twentieth century than with the concept of ‘cultural orientation’ elaborated in chapter 
15.  
  The first version of chapter 1, on my first anthropological fieldwork in 1968, was 
written in 1969 at the request of Douwe Jongmans, who had been the principal 
supervisor of my Tunisia fieldwork, although my theses subsequently based on that 
research were supervised by others. The Dutch version of this paper circulated as an 
internal report within the Department of Anthropology, Amsterdam University, until 
a much revised and expanded version was published in 1987.1 The English 
translation was made by Susan Janssen and Wim van Binsbergen. I wish to register 
my indebtedness to Douwe Jongmans, Klaas van der Veen, Marielou Creyghton and 
Pieter van Dijk, whose academic advice and logistic support were essential to the 
research-training project described here. I am indebted to the University of 
Amsterdam for a grant towards my 1968 fieldwork, and to the Musée des Arts et des 
Traditions populaires, Tunis, for research clearance in that connection. Later trips 
were made in 1970, 1979 and 2002, in which connection I express my gratitude to 
the Free University Amsterdam (1979) and the African Studies Centre, Leiden 
(2002). 
  A first version of chapter 2, on Pierre-Philippe Rey’s work, was presented at the 
African Studies Centre, Leiden, in the Autumn of 1979; later versions at a seminar I 
gave as Simon Professor, Department of Social Anthropology, University of 
Manchester, February 1980, and at a seminar of the Dutch Association of African 
Studies, Leiden, 4 November 1983. I am indebted to Martin Doornbos, Peter 
Geschiere, Terence Ranger, and Pierre-Philippe Rey, for their stimulating remarks, 
and to Ria van Hal, Adrienne van Wijngaarden and Mieke Zwart-Brouwer for typing 
successive drafts of this paper. The paper was published in: van Binsbergen, W.M.J., 
& Hesseling, G.S.C.M., 1984, eds., Aspecten van Staat en Maatschappij in Afrika: 
Recent Dutch and Belgian Research on the African State, Leiden: African Studies 
Centre, pp. 163-180, which has been out of print for many years. A German version 
appeared as: van Binsbergen, W.M.J., 1984, ‘Kann die Ethnologie zur Theorie des 
Klassenkampfes in der Peripherie werden?: Reflexionen über das Werk von Pierre-
Philippe Rey’, Österreichische Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 9, 4: 138-148. 
  After having been drafted and repeatedly and extensively revised from 1984 
onwards, chapter 3 was originally published in Dutch in 1987,2 in a book Afrika in 
Spiegelbeeld, which I edited jointly with Martin Doornbos. The chapter was based 
1 Van Binsbergen 1987b. 
2 Van Binsbergen 1987a. 
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on anthropological and historical fieldwork I undertook in western Zambia and 
under migrants from this area in Lusaka, from 1972 to 1974, and during shorter 
periods in 1977, 1978 and 1981; and which I subsequently visited in 1988, 1989, 
1992 (twice), 1994 (twice) and 1995. In addition to the persons and institutions 
mentioned in the general acknowledgements at the end of this section, I am indebted 
to the Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO) 
for financial support while writing up in the academic year 1974-1975. The English 
translation of chapter 3 was made by Juultje Heymans and Wim van Binsbergen. I 
am indebted to Martin Doornbos for stimulating comments. I am dedicating this 
piece to my eldest daughter, Nezjma, whose name derives from my first fieldwork. 
As a toddler she lived through the (especially medical) agonies of my first fieldwork 
among the Nkoya. Her first language was Nkoya. It was by imagining her as an 
adolescent girl undergoing the Nkoya puberty rites, that I opened up to their beauty 
and wisdom. 
  Chapter 4 is a revised version of an argument originally presented at the African 
Futures Conference, Centre of African Studies, Edinburgh, 9-11 December 1987, 
celebrating that institution’s twenty-fifth anniversary. The original version was 
published as: van Binsbergen, W.M.J., 1988, ‘Reflections on the future of anthrop-
ology in Africa’, in: Fyfe, C., ed., African futures: Twenty-fifth Anniversary 
Conference, Edinburgh: Centre of African Studies, Seminar Proceedings, No. 28, pp. 
293-309. To the present version extensive references have been added whereas the 
original version had none; the original 1987 postscript has been incorporated in the 
main text now, whereas a new postscript has been added in order to comment on the 
1987 situation from the perspective of 2002.  
  The specific fieldwork on which chapter 5 (as well as the rest of Part III) is based 
was undertaken in Francistown and surrounding areas, Botswana, in April-May 
1988, November 1988-October 1989, and during shorter visits in 1990, 1991, 1992, 
1994, 1994, 1995, and 1999. I am greatly indebted to the African Studies Centre, 
Leiden, for funding and encouragement; and to the Applied Research Unit, Ministry 
of Local Government and Lands, Republic of Botswana, for local support. A first 
Dutch version was published1 in a Festschrift for Gerrit Grootenhuis (director of the 
African Studies Centre, Leiden, in the 1960s-1980s). Earlier English versions of this 
paper were presented at the Seminar on ‘Symbol and Symptom’, Africa Research 
Centre, Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium, January 1991; and at the Seventh 
Satterthwaite Colloquium on African Religion and Ritual, Satterthwaite (Cumbria, 
U.K.), April 1991. I am grateful to Robert Baum, René Devisch, Ørnulf Gulbrand-
sen, Adrian Hastings, John Janzen, Murray Last, Cesare Poppi, Matthew Schoffel-
eers, Elizabeth Tonkin, Richard Werbner and David Zeitlyn for stimulating 
comments, and especially to Robert Buijtenhuijs, whose incisive and dismissive 
comments on an early version helped me to define my position much more clearly, 
although this did not prevent our further, and increasingly contentious, exchanges on 




                                                          
this issue. A much shorter English version was published as: ‘Becoming a sangoma: 
Religious anthropological field-work in Francistown, Botswana’, Journal of Religion 
in Africa, 21, 4: 309-344; I am indebted to that journal’s editor and its publisher, 
Brill, Leiden, for their generous consent to include the greatly revised paper in the 
present book. 
  Chapter 6 originated in such a further exchange with Robert Buijtenhuijs: his 
draft of an Open Letter, intended to explode, within the Dutch Africanist commun-
ity, my claims of being an initiated and certified Southern African diviner-priest. For 
reasons of collegial consideration Buijtenhuijs graciously gave up the idea of 
publishing his spirited draft, but, being less gracious myself, and having been greatly 
stimulated by Buijtenhuijs’ thoughtful text,a revised Dutch version of my apology, 
revised so as to be independent from Buijtenhuijs’ text, was published in a 
Festschrift for Matthew Schoffeleers in 1999.1 In addition to Robert Buijtenhuijs I 
am indebted, especially to my beloved wife Patricia van Binsbergen-Saegerman, and 
further to René Devisch, Gerti Hesseling, Bonno Thoden van Velzen, Jacqueline 
Bhabha, Ineke van Wetering, Richard Werbner, Jos van der Klei and Heinz 
Kimmerle, to the successive year groups of the students of my course on ‘Some 
foundations of intercultural philosophy’, Erasmus University Rotterdam, and to the 
clients who, from 1990 onwards, have applied to me for sangoma divination and 
therapy both in Africa and worldwide – all of whom have helped me to bring some 
clarity into the contradictions of pursuing an African ritual specialist role in a North 
Atlantic environment, and as a North Atlantic senior academic.2 
  Chapter 7 was written in the summer of 2002, after most of this book had been in 
preparation for years and had more or less attained its final shape. Working on the 
book, and circulating it for several years among my colleagues, my students, and the 
visitors of my websites, had enhanced both my confidence and my sense that 
something essential was still missing, that I was holding back in a way unbecoming 
a professional philosopher. I am indebted to those of my colleagues who have 
challenged my earlier views on sangomahood, and to my students and sometime 
assistants Louise Müller and Roderick van den Bosch, for driving home the 
inadequacy of this position. So finally, to the political and emotional arguments that 
I had been using to justify my ‘becoming a sangoma’, I now add epistemological 
ones. Thus I draw the systematic lessons which this anecdotal episode in one 
person’s life can be argued to have for our understanding of interculturality, the 
human condition, and the structure of the world. An earlier version of chapter 7 was 
presented at the conference on ‘Wereldbeelden, wetenschappen en wij: Naar meer 
kritische, verantwoorde en open wetenschappen’ [World views, the sciences and us: 
Towards a more critical, more responsible and less entrenched conception of 
science], Centre Leo Apostel for the Philosophy of Science, Free University, 
Brussels, Belgium, 10 June 2003. I am indebted to Nicole Note for organising this 
1 Van Binsbergen 1998b. 
2 Cf. van Binsbergen 2001c, 2002b, 2002c. 
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exciting event, and to René Devisch and Dirk Aerts for stimulating comments on my 
paper made in that connection. The discussion, in this chapter, of the epistemological 
dimensions of sangoma science as independently unlocking – for such is my claim – 
sources of valid knowledge that happen not to be admissible to North Atlantic 
science, summarises more extensive arguments which I was invited to present before 
the Annual Meeting of the Netherlands Association for the Philosophy of Science, 
November 2001, and the UNESCO conference on African rationality held in Porto 
Novo, Benin, in September 2002.  
  Also chapter 8 was written from the summer of 2002 onwards, as an afterthought 
addition to this book, in a final attempt to live up to the lessons of chapter 7 
concerning Old World long-range cultural interconnectedness, and the unitary 
underlying structure of truth and meaning. The chapter shows how a Southern 
African cult may contain many South Asian elements; it originally was to 
accommodate my extensive analysis of leopard-skin symbolism throughout the Old 
World, which however soon grew into a separate book, The Leopard’s Unchanging 
Spots, currently being finalised for publication.  
  Earlier versions of chapter 9 were presented at the September 1997 meeting of 
the Research Group of the Dutch–Flemish Association for Intercultural Philosophy 
(NVVIF), and at the conference ‘Common sense (sensus communis) in arts and 
politics in Western and non-Western philosophies’, organised by the NVVIF and the 
Faculty of Philosophy at Erasmus University Rotterdam, November 21-22, 1997. 
For useful comments I am indebted to the members of the Research Group and the 
conference participants, and particularly to my colleague Henk Oosterling. The piece 
has been published1 in a collective volume edited by Heinz Kimmerle and Henk 
Oosterling and published with Rodopi, Amsterdam/Atlanta. I am indebted to the 
editors and publishers for their generous consent to include the paper in the present 
book.  
  Chapter 10 was originally presented at the Wageningen conference on ‘Decision-
making in natural resources management, with a focus on adaptive management’, 
organised by IUCN-SUI, Tropenbos and the Department of Forestry of Wageningen 
Agricultural University, 23 September, 1999.  
  The first Dutch version of chapter 11 was originally presented at the symposium 
Verzoend of verscheurd? (‘Reconciled or torn apart?’) at the Bezinningscentrum 
(‘Centre for Contemplation’), Free University, Amsterdam, 9 October, 1997. An 
earlier, Dutch version of this paper appeared in the journal In de Marge, December, 
1997.2 I am indebted to the Trust Fund of the Erasmus University Rotterdam, for 
funding a trip to South Africa in the context of which a much enlarged English 
version of this paper was presented at the Human Sciences Research Council, 
Pretoria, South Africa, 21 April, 1999; I am grateful to the members of that 
institution for illuminating discussions in this connection.  
1 Van Binsbergen 2000a. 




  The original Dutch version of chapter 12 was prepared for the Dutch–Flemish 
Day of Philosophy (theme ‘globalisation’), Catholic University Tilburg, Philosoph-
ical Faculty, 30 October 1999; that version was published in the Proceedings of this 
conference: Baars, J., & Starmans, E., eds., Het Eigene en het Andere: Filosofie en 
Globalisering: Acta van de 21e Nederlands-Vlaamse Filosofiedag, Delft: Eburon, 
pp. 37-52. I am indebted to Raymond Corbey for chairing the panel within which the 
paper was presented, and for encouraging comments.  
  Acceding to the chair of intercultural philosophy, Philosophical Faculty, 
Erasmus University Rotterdam, turned out to imply membership of the Working 
Group on ‘Philosophy of Information and Communication Technology’ (FICT). In 
that connection chapter 13 was originally written and discussed on various 
occasions. The Dutch version has now appeared as part of a book edited by Jos de 
Mul: van Binsbergen, W.M.J., 2002, ‘ICT vanuit intercultureel perspectief: Een 
Afrikaanse verkenning’, in: Filosofie in Cyberspace: Reflecties op de Informatie- en 
Communicatietechnologie, Kampen: Klement, pp. 88-115. English versions were 
presented before the Theme Group on Globalisation, African Studies Centre (1999), 
Leiden; at the African Studies Centre’s seminar; at the monthly seminar of the 
WOTRO (Netherlands Foundation for Tropical Research) Research Programme on 
Globalization and the Construction of Communal Identities (1999); at the 
Department of Philosophy, University of Ghana, 25 June, 2000; and at the 
International Conference on Globalization and New Questions of Ownership, 
African Studies Centre, Leiden, April 2002. I am grateful to the African Studies 
Centre, Leiden, for financing my trips to Botswana (where part of the material for 
this chapter was collected) and to Ghana. For useful comments, I am grateful to the 
participants in these various groups and meetings, and moreover to Hans Achterhuis, 
Gerti Hesseling, Francis Nyamnjoh, Elli de Rijk, and Willem Veerman.  
  When Vernie February became a member of the theme group on Globalisation I 
initiated and chaired at the African Studies Centre, Leiden, in 1996, he kindled my 
interest in the emergence of ubuntu as a key concept in contemporary Southern 
African transformation processes – an interest since intensified through contacts with 
Mogobe Ramose, Oswell Hapanyengwi, and the Human Sciences Research Council, 
Pretoria, South Africa; with the latter institution an ultimately abortive plan was 
worked out for a major conference on the topic. Against this background, a first 
version of chapter 14 was presented at the conference on African Renaissance and 
Ubuntu Philosophy held in May 2001 at the University of Groningen, organised by 
Pieter Boele van Hensbroek. The ethnographic passages in the present chapter are 
largely based on my anthropological and historical fieldwork in Zambia and 
Botswana, with extensions to Zimbabwe and South Africa, since 1971, for which I 
owe acknowledgements to: my family; to my African friends and relatives particip-
ating in these researches; to the African Studies Centre, Leiden, the Netherlands; the 
Trust Fund, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands; the University of 
Zambia; the Ministry of Lands, Local Government and Housing, Botswana; the 
University of Durban-Westville, South Africa; and the Human Sciences Research 
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Council, South Africa. For this specific chapter I am indebted, besides those already 
mentioned, to Simon Simonse, Marleen Ramsey, the participants in the Groningen 
conference, and finally to the members of the department of the Philosophy of Man 
and Culture (Erasmus University Rotterdam), as well as to René Devisch, Peter 
Crossman, and Koen Stroeken (Africa Research Centre, Louvain, Belgium), for 
illuminating criticism of later versions in April 2002. The text has now been 
published in a special issue on African Renaissance and Ubuntu Philosophy of the 
journal Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy, under the editorship of Pieter 
Boele van Hensbroek; his editorship has also benefitted the version included in the 
present volume. I am indebted to that journal’s editor for generous consent to include 
this chapter in the present book. Vernie February died while this book was in the 
final stages of preparation, and I dedicate this chapter to his memory. 
  Chapter 15, finally, is the substantially rewritten English translation of the text I 
presented during the inaugural ceremony when taking up the chair of intercultural 
philosophy, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 21 January, 1999. The text was 
simultaneously published as a small book: van Binsbergen, W.M.J., 1999, ‘Culturen 
bestaan niet’: Het onderzoek van Interculturaliteit als een Openbreken van 
Vanzelfsprekendheden, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam: Rotterdamse 
Filosofische Studies. The English text was published as: van Binsbergen, W.M.J., 
2002, ‘ ‘‘Cultures do not exist’’: Exploding self-evidences in the investigation of 
interculturality’, Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy, 13: 37-114; in that 
connection I have been fortunate again to benefit from the stimulating editorship of 
Pieter Boele van Hensbroek, which was also reflected in the version included in the 
present book. An Italian version was published in 2002.1 I am indebted to Quest’s 
editor for generous consent to include this chapter in the present book. Shorter 
English versions were presented at the Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria, 
South Africa, 25 April 1999, and at the Conference on African Epistemologies, 
École des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, France, 17-19 May 1999; I am 
indebted to the participants for fruitful discussions on these occasions, and to the 
Trust Fund of Erasmus University for funding these trips. I have dedicated this long 
and ambitious chapter to my friend and colleague, the anthropologist Richard 
Fardon. In what was also for him an extremely busy period (during which he had to 
write his own inaugural address for his chair at the School of Oriental and African 
Studies, London) he graciously offered to undertake my share of a joint book 
project,2 releasing me to work on my own inaugural and thus easing somewhat the 
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